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Abstract
This paper presents an examination of the socially eﬃcient formation of environmental
R&D in Cournot duopoly in a setting where a regulator has no precommitment ability for
an emission tax. The results reveal that if the environmental damage is slight, alternatively,
given severe environmental damage and large ineﬃciency in environmental R&D costs, then
environmental research joint venture (ERJV) cartelization is socially eﬃcient. However, if
environmental damage is severe, and if a firm’s R&D costs are limited, then, in stark contrast
to results of previous studies, environmental R&D competition is socially more eﬃcient than
the other three scenarios (i.e., environmental R&D cartelization, ERJV competition, and
ERJV cartelization), although R&D competition is the case of “NO information sharing and
NO R&D coordination.”
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Introduction

Innovation is strongly encouraged by both competition and cooperation among firms with market
power. It should be regarded as a part of the design of a competition policy. The truth
is that research joint ventures (RJVs) used to be taboo in US competition policy until the US
government enacted the National Cooperative Research Act (NCRA) in 1984.1 However, in 1961
the Japanese government enacted the Act on Mining and Manufacturing Industry Technology
Research Association on the model of research association system in the UK.2 This law increased
the number of RJVs formed in Japan. At that time, Japanese firms were poor compared to
those of other economically developed countries. For that reason, the Japanese government
recommended that firms form RJVs. As a consequence, the shortage of funds yielded a strategic
promotion of RJV. Forming a RJV is now regarded as a firm’s usual strategy to survive market
competition.3 In the competition policies of many developed countries, RJVs are allowable
subject to a rule of reason rather than being illegal per se.4
In the field of economics of environmental regulation, several studies have been undertaken to
reveal better R&D formation to internalize environmental externalities with a highly advanced
emission abatement technology or to improve environmental quality (e.g., Chiou and Hu (2001),
Poyago-Theotoky (2007, 2010), and Yakita and Yamauchi (2011)).5 However, clear-cut and comprehensive policy maps of socially eﬃcient R&D formations corresponding to various regulatory
circumstances are not still provided. With respect to forming a RJV, Grossman and Shapiro
(1986, Section 4) point out that two conflicting eﬀects exists: social benefits and anticompetitive
dangers. Furthermore, in the field of law and policy, it has been considered that RJV should be
evaluated from the perspective of a rule of reason. Nevertheless, investigations and discussions
of RJV for emissions reduction are utterly inadequate. Unfortunately, evaluation under a rule
of reason lags far behind real-world environmental innovation. Therefore, the question persists:
under what circumstances is RJV in an environmental area socially justified? This question has
not been answered. This paper presents an examination of the question of whether environmental research joint venture (ERJV) formations within a symmetric R&D/Cournot model improve
social welfare.
To investigate that question analytically, following the well-known definition of R&D scenarios by Kamien et al. (1992, p.1295), we introduce two ERJV formation scenarios–ERJV
competition and ERJV cartelization–into a setting where a regulator has no precommitment
ability for an emission tax (i.e., time-consistent emission tax)[see Table 1]. In the cases of such
ERJV formations, both firms must agree to share environmental R&D findings completely before the R&D stage. The diﬀerence between ERJV competition and ERJV cartelization lies in
the absence or presence of coordination of each firm’s R&D eﬀort level in the R&D stage.
In this article, to examine the welfare performance of ERJV, we compare these ERJV for1

The primary aim of the NCRA was to relax US antitrust law.
For details of this Japanese case, see Nakamura et al. (1997) and Sakakibara and Cho (2002).
3
For details of economic studies of RJV, see Katsoutacos and Ulph (1998), Amir (2000a), Cassiman (2000),
Kline (2000), Vilasuso and Frascatore (2000), Caloghirou et al.(2003), Leahy and Neary (2005), Atallah (2007),
Socorro (2007), and others.
4
For details related to a rule of reason, see Areeda (1986).
5
As some representative studies of environmental R&D from the empirical side, for example, see Scott (2003,
2005).
2
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mations’ equilibrium outcomes with the equilibrium outcomes of environmental R&D competition/cartelization explored by Poyago-Theotoky (2007). Examinations conducted by PoyagoTheotoky (2007) did not consider a possibility of endogenous ERJV formations. Therefore, the
technological spillover eﬀect is invariably given exogenously in her model: firms can not control
it. However, we include two options of endogenous ERJV formation in which firms can set the
technological spillover eﬀect at the full level from the initial given level, only if both firms agree
on full information sharing of environmental R&D findings before the R&D stage.6 This study
compares the four scenarios defined in Table 1.
Table 1: Four scenarios.7
Scenarios

R&D stage

Production stage (after R&D stage)

Environmental R&D
competition (case N)

Firms compete. Each firm decides its own environmental R&D investment level to maximize its own profit given R&D investments of
the rival.

Firms compete (under emission tax policy).
Emissions are reduced by the firm’s environmental R&D investment and some spillover
eﬀects from rivals’ fruits of R&D activity.

Environmental R&D
cartelization (case C)

Each firm coordinates its own environmental
R&D investment level to maximize joint profits.

Firms compete (under emission tax policy).
Emissions are reduced by the firm’s environmental R&D investment and some spillover
eﬀects from rivals’ fruits of R&D activity.

ERJV
competition
(case NJ)

Firms agree to form an ERJV to avoid duplication of R&D activities. Firms fully share
the fruits of environmental R&D. The degree
of technological spillover is perfect. However,
each firm chooses its own R&D investment
level non-cooperatively to maximize its own
profit.

Firms compete (under emission tax policy).
Emissions are reduced by the sum of all environmental R&D eﬀorts in the industry.

ERJV cartelization
(case CJ)

Firms agree to form an ERJV to avoid duplication of R&D activities. Firms fully share
the fruits of environmental R&D. The degree
of technological spillover is perfect. Firms coordinate their R&D investment level to maximize joint profits.

Firms compete (under emission tax policy).
Emissions are reduced by the sum of all environmental R&D eﬀorts in the industry.

In the context of policy design in an oligopolistic market, strategic interactions exist between
the government and firms with market power. In the absence of a precommitment ability related
to the emission tax rate, firms’ environmental R&D investment can aﬀect the government’s
future decision-making for emission tax policy. Strictly speaking, polluting firms can have some
incentives for large environmental R&D investment to elicit a lower emission tax rate from
the government. The eﬀect is designated as a ratchet eﬀect.8 The problems of timing and
precommitment ability in environmental policy has been explored widely (Abrego and Perroni
(2002), Requate (2005), and Brunner et al.(2012)), but little attention has been devoted to the
6
For examples of related literature related to endogenous spillover model in the context of cost-reducing R&D,
see Katsoutacos and Ulph (1998) and Gersbach and Schmutzler (2003).
7
This table follows Kamien et al. (1992, Table 1).
8
For details of discussions about a ratchet eﬀect, see Hepburn (2006, Section 5), Puller (2006), and Brunner
et al.(2012, Section 3.1.3).
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welfare performance of ERJV in the presence of ratchet eﬀect. The primary purpose of this
study is to clarify that point, which remains obscure.
Our main contributions are the following. First, we demonstrate that both firms will invariably form ERJV cartelization within a symmetric R&D/Cournot model to the extent that
the government approves completely R&D coordination and full information sharing under the
time-consistent emission tax. Neither ERJV competition nor environmental R&D competition/cartelization is formed spontaneously in this context. Second, although we confirm that
the welfare performance of ERJV cartelization always dominates ERJV competition and environmental R&D cartelization, we also demonstrate, in sharp contrast to results of previous
works, that ERJV cartelization is not necessarily socially eﬃcient or acceptable. The welfare
performance of ERJV cartelization varies with conditions of three exogenous parameters: environmental damage, cost eﬃciency of R&D investment, and the initial technological spillover
eﬀect. We identify the conditions in which environmental R&D competition is socially more efficient than ERJV cartelization. In other words, this article reveals the border of policy change
between environmental R&D competition and ERJV cartelization. We provide complete examinations of ERJV formations under time-consistent emission tax and theoretical foundations for
ERJV policy and firms’ behaviors.
This paper is presented as follows. The next section introduces the model and some preliminary points related to the evaluation of ERJV. The third section is an exploration of the firm
profitability under ERJV. The fourth section presents an examination of which R&D regime has
social superiority; then it presents a derivation of theoretical contributions and policy implications. The final section presents conclusions.

2

The model and some preliminary points

First, Section 2.1 presents the model to investigate the welfare performance of ERJV.9 Second, as some preliminary points related to the derivation of new findings, Section 2.2 provides
equilibrium outcomes under four scenarios defined in Table 1.

2.1

The model

This paper assumes an industry comprising two homogeneous firms (firm i and firm j) engaging
in a quantity competition with the same cost structure and emissions-reducing technology. Then
qi denotes firm i’s output. Demand is given as p(qi , qj ) = a − (qi + qj ), (i, j = 1, 2; i 6= j), where
a(> 0) is a market size parameter.
The value of each firm’s emissions per unit output is one. Firm i’s environmental R&D eﬀort
is captured by zi . Both firms use end-of-pipe technology for pollution abatement. Although
this technology is insuﬃcient for reducing emissions per unit output, it mitigates emissions by
adsorbing pollution at the end of the production process. Flue gas desulfurization equipment
and activated carbon adsorption equipment are examples of end-of-pipe technology.
Firm i receives benefits not only from its own environmental R&D eﬀort but also from the
eﬀort of its rival. When firm i’s production level is qi , then the R&D expenditure (γ/2)zi2 , (γ > 0)
9
Whereas the current model fundamentally follows the Poyago-Theotoky (2007) model, the setting of this
article includes the Poyago-Theotoky model for subgames. See also the footnote 12.
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enables firm i to abate its emissions from qi to ei (qi , zi ) ≡ qi −zi −βzj . A lower value of γ implies
higher eﬃciency of the R&D cost. Symmetric parameter β ∈ [0, 1] denotes spillover eﬀects
of environmental R&D. Firm i’s positive externalities from a rival’s R&D eﬀort are captured
by βzj . No fixed costs for pollution abatement are necessary.10 In addition, firm i’s total
cost function is additively separable with respect to production costs and R&D expenditures:
C(qi , zi ) = cqi + (γ/2)zi2 , (c > 0, A ≡ a − c > 0).
Firm i’s net emissions ei (qi , zi ) depend on both the output and environmental R&D eﬀort.
P2
2
Total emissions E ≡
i=1 ei (qi , zi ) cause environmental damage D(E) ≡ dE /2; d(> d ≡
√
(−1 + 3)/2) is the damage coeﬃcient.11 Social welfare SW is defined as the sum of consumers’ surplus and the producer’s surplus less environmental damage D(E) and total R&D
P
expenditures, 2i=1 (γ/2)zi2 .
When an ERJV is formed between two firms, full information sharing is conducted. Therefore, in the case of ERJV, the value of spillover parameter, β, is endogenously set as β = 1 by
each firm. This article assumes that no fixed costs for ERJV are necessary.
In this model, the government has policy instruments of two types. One is competition policy:
a combination of ERJV policy and approval/disapproval of R&D coordination. At the first stage,
the government decides according to a rule of reason whether an ERJV is socially prohibited,
and also whether R&D coordination is socially allowable. The other role is emission tax policy.
This study assumes that the government has no precommitment ability for an emission tax
rate t. The tax rate is determined to maximize social welfare after firms’ environmental R&D
investment at stage 2. The time structure is the following.12
Stage 1: The government decides whether an ERJV between two firms is socially prohibited,
and also whether R&D coordination is socially allowable.
Stage 2: When ERJV is allowable, firms choose whether they form an ERJV.
Stage 3: Firms determine whether they behave in environmental R&D activities cooperatively or non-cooperatively. Furthermore, each firm also chooses its environmental
R&D eﬀort level.
Stage 4: The regulator determines the emission tax rate to maximize social welfare.
Stage 5: Firm i determines its output level non-cooperatively to maximize its own profit.

2.2

Equilibrium outcomes

The solution concept used here is the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE). The fivestage game explained above is solved by backward induction. This subsection presents the
examinations of subgames: stages 3, 4, and 5. A brief sketch of solution procedures under four
scenarios defined in Table 1 and results are as follows.
10

Most existing incumbents in the chemical products industry have installed emissions-reducing equipment of
end-of-pipe type. Such firms’ investments in quality-improvement of desulfurization catalyst and hydrodenitrogenation catalyst are applicable to this model because no fixed set-up cost for abatement is required. In contrast
to the current model, the installation of a new pollution abatement technology incurs a fixed set-up cost. As an
example of the model including such a fixed set-up cost, see Requate and Unold (2003).
√
11
An interior solution for environmental R&D is guaranteed by the following assumption: d > d ≡ (−1 + 3)/2.
For details, see Ouchida and Goto (2011).
12
Stages 3, 4, and 5 in this paper are identical to the three-stage game developed by Poyago-Theotoky (2007).
Stages 1 and 2 are newly added for the analyses described in this paper.
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2.2.1

Environmental R&D competition

In this case, neither firm forms an ERJV or coordinates R&D eﬀort level. In the last stage, firm
i’s profit is
πi (qi , qj ) = {a − (qi + qj )}qi − cqi − t{qi − zi − βzj } − (γ/2)zi2 .
Each firm decides its own output level non-cooperatively and simultaneously. From the firstorder conditions for profit maximization, the symmetric equilibrium output is derived as q(t) =
(A − t)/3.
Consequently, social welfare in Stage 4 is calculated as
SW (t) = 2Aq(t) − 2[q(t)]2 − (d/2){2q(t) − (1 + β){zi + zj }}2 −

2
X
(γ/2)zi2 .
i=1

The regulator determines the emission tax rate to maximize social welfare. From the first-order
condition for social welfare maximization, the subgame equilibrium tax rate is obtained as
t(zi , zj ) =

(2d − 1)A − 3d(1 + β){zi + zj }
.
2(1 + d)

(1)

Therefore, firm i’s profit during the third stage is
πi (zi , zj ) = [q(t(zi , zj ))]2 + t(zi , zj ){zi + βzj } − (γ/2)zi2 .
Each firm non-cooperatively and simultaneously determines its environmental R&D eﬀort. The
first-order conditions for profit maximization, ∂πi (zi , zj )/∂zi = 0, (i, j = 1, 2; i 6= j), generate
the following equilibrium R&D eﬀorts.13
zN =

[(1 + d)(2d − 1) + d(1 + β)]A
.
2γ(1 + d)2 + d(1 + β)[3(3 + β) + d(7 + β)]

The equilibrium levels of the emission tax rate, output level for each firm, profit, and social
welfare are presented in Table 2.
2.2.2

Environmental R&D cartelization

Solution procedures of stages 4 and 5 are identical to those in Section 2.2.1. However, environmental R&D cartelization implies that two firms do not form an ERJV, but they cooperatively and simultaneously determine their environmental R&D eﬀort to maximize joint profits,
πi (zi , zj ) + πj (zi , zj ), during the third stage. Then, the equilibrium levels of the equilibrium
outcomes are derived in Table 2.14

13

Subscript “N” stands for the case of environmental R&D competition. This paper follows the scheme employed
by Kamien et al. (1992).
14
Subscript “C” denotes the case of environmental R&D cartelization.
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2.2.3

ERJV competition

In this case, both firms form an ERJV to avoid duplication of R&D activities and share all
R&D information, but they do not coordinate the R&D eﬀort level. When the ERJV is formed,
firms can control the degree of technological spillover. Full sharing of the fruits of R&D is
characterized by β = 1, although the value of β is exogenous in the previous two cases. The
equilibrium outcomes under ERJV competition are produced from the equilibrium values of
environmental R&D competition case after setting β = 1. The results are presented in Table
2.15
2.2.4

ERJV cartelization

In this case, both firms form an ERJV to avoid duplication of R&D activities. They coordinate
the R&D eﬀort level to maximize joint profits during the third stage. In addition, sharing of
the fruits of R&D is fully conducted. As in the case of ERJV competition, firms can control the
degree of spillover eﬀect and set β = 1. The equilibrium outcomes under ERJV cartelization
are derived from the equilibrium values of environmental R&D cartelization case after setting
β = 1. Results are calculated in Table 2.16

3

Firm profitability under ERJV

It is possible to analyze firms’ behavior at stage 2. ERJV is not implemented without more profitability rather than any other scenario. This section presents an examination of whether ERJV
yields for each firm more profitability. With regard to private incentive of R&D cooperation,
Poyago-Theotoky (2007, p.70) shows that πC > πN .17 That study straightforwardly demonstrates that πCJ > πNJ when β = 1. Consequently, ERJV competition is not implemented.
Comparing the equilibrium profit under ERJV cartelization, πCJ , with that under environmental R&D cartelization, πC , engenders the following proposition.
Proposition 1. πCJ ≥ πC > πN for all d > d, γ > 0 and β ∈ [0, 1].
Proof: See Appendix A. ¤
The investigations above state that ERJV cartelization between symmetric Cournot duopolists
always yields the greatest profitability among four scenarios. Therefore, both firms invariably
carry out ERJV cartelization at stage 2 unless it is prohibited. The intuitive explanation here
is that, under ERJV cartelization, each firm can avoid R&D competition and enjoy the highest
free-rider eﬀect and joint-profit maximization eﬀect.
In the literature related to cost-reducing R&D, papers by Atallah (2005a, 2005b), Lambertini
and Rossini (2009) and others reveal RJV cartelization as privately beneficial for each firm.
Proposition 1 signifies that, irrespective of the diﬀerence of the theoretical framework between
the emission-reducing R&D model and the cost-reducing R&D model, there exist some private
incentives for RJV cartelization.
15

Subscript “NJ” stands for the case of ERJV competition.
Subscript “CJ” stands for the case of ERJV cartelization.
17
See Appendix A.
16
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qN =

Output level

Social welfare

Profits

Output level

Emission tax rate

Environmental R&D eﬀorts

Social welfare

2
2
πN = qN
+ tN (1 + β)zN − (γ/2)zN

[2(1 + d)γ + d(1 + β)(7 + 4d + 3β)]A
4γ(1 + d)2 + 2d(1 + β)[3(3 + β) + d(7 + β)]

[d(2d − 3)(1 + β)2 + 2γ(2d2 + d − 1)]A
4γ(1 + d)2 + 2d(1 + β)[3(3 + β) + d(7 + β)]

[(1 + d)(2d − 1) + d(1 + β)]A
2γ(1 + d)2 + d(1 + β)[3(3 + β) + d(7 + β)]

(2d2 + 3d − 1)A
2γ(1 + d)2 + 8d(3 + 2d)

2
2
SWNJ = 2AqNJ − 2qNJ
− 2d{qNJ − 2zNJ }2 − γzNJ

2
2
πNJ = qNJ
+ 2tNJ zNJ − (γ/2)zNJ

[(1 + d)γ + 2d(5 + 2d)]A
2γ(1 + d)2 + 8d(3 + 2d)

[2d(2d − 3) + γ(2d2 + d − 1)]A
2γ(1 + d)2 + 8d(3 + 2d)

qNJ =

tNJ =

zNJ =

ERJV competition

2
2
SWN = 2AqN − 2qN
− 2d{qN − (1 + β)zN }2 − γzN

tN =

Emission tax rate

Profits

zN =

Environmental R&D eﬀorts

Environmental R&D competition
(1 + β)[(1 + d)(2d − 1) + 2d]A
2γ(1 + d)2 + 4d(3 + 2d)(1 + β)2

(2d2 + 3d − 1)A
γ(1 + d)2 + 8d(3 + 2d)

2
2
SWCJ = 2AqCJ − 2qCJ
− 2d{qCJ − 2zCJ }2 − γzCJ

2
2
πCJ = qCJ
+ 2tCJ zCJ − (γ/2)zCJ

[4d(5 + 2d) + γ(1 + d)]A
2γ(1 + d)2 + 16d(3 + 2d)

[4d(2d − 3) + γ(2d2 + d − 1)]A
2γ(1 + d)2 + 16d(3 + 2d)
qCJ =

tCJ =

zCJ =

ERJV cartelization

2
2
SWC = 2AqC − 2qC
− 2d{qC − (1 + β)zC }2 − γzC

2
2
πC = qC
+ tC (1 + β)zC − (γ/2)zC

[d(5 + 2d)(1 + β)2 + γ(1 + d)]A
2γ(1 + d)2 + 4d(3 + 2d)(1 + β)2

[d(2d − 3)(1 + β)2 + γ(2d2 + d − 1)]A
2γ(1 + d)2 + 4d(3 + 2d)(1 + β)2

qC =

tC =

zC =

Environmental R&D cartelization

Table 2: Equilibrium outcomes under four scenarios.
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4

R&D regimes and social superiority

Next we explore the government’s decision-making at stage 1. With respect to the equilibrium social welfare presented in Table 2, from Poyago-Theotoky’s (2007) investigation, it can
be understood that SWCJ > SWNJ .18 Therefore, the equilibrium social welfare under ERJV
cartelization dominates that under ERJV competition. Hereinafter, we do not analyze the
case of ERJV competition. Instead, we concentrate on the welfare performance of the other
R&D regimes. This section presents an examination of whether equilibrium social welfare under
ERJV cartelization dominates that under the other two R&D scenarios: environmental R&D
competition and environmental R&D cartelization.

4.1

Environmental R&D cartelization versus ERJV cartelization

Comparing equilibrium social welfare under environmental R&D cartelization, SWC , with that
under ERJV cartelization, SWCJ , engenders the following proposition.
Proposition 2. SWCJ ≥ SWC for all d > d, γ > 0 and β ∈ [0, 1].
Proof: See Appendix B. ¤
This proposition states that, in terms of social-welfare maximization, ERJV cartelization
invariably dominates the case of environmental R&D cartelization. Full information sharing
generates welfare superiority compared with the case of R&D cartelization. This result is consistent with our intuition.

4.2

Environmental R&D competition versus ERJV cartelization

We now compare the two equilibrium social welfare levels. The diﬀerence between SWCJ and
SWN is given as shown below.
SWCJ − SWN =

J(d, γ; β)A2
R 0.
[∆β=1 ]2 Γ2

(2)

Appendix C presents details of Equation (2). Figure 1 presents a graphical analysis of this
comparison. First, with respect to welfare ranking of each region in Figure 1, we confirm the
following results. In the region above (below) the curve γϕ in Figure 1, SWC ≥ (<)SWN
and zC ≥ (<)zN .19 In addition, when the degree of spillover is perfect (i.e., β = 1), then
SWCJ > SWNJ .
Next, let us specifically examine the case of imperfect spillover (i.e., β 6= 1). Then, as
new findings, the following are apparent. When d < d ≤ 3/2, then J(d, γ; β) ≥ 0; i.e., ERJV
18

See Equation (14), Corollary 1 and Proof of Proposition 2 in Appendix A in Poyago-Theotoky (2007). In her
analysis, ERJVs are not examined as the central question. Strictly speaking, she shows that SWC |β=1 > SWN |β=1
in the special case in which the value of exogenous parameter β is one.
19
The definition of ϕ is given by Poyago-Theotoky (2007, p.69). The definition of γϕ is γϕ ≡ {γ > 0|ϕ ≡
d(3 − 2d)(1 + β)2 (1 − β) + 2γ(2d2 β + 2dβ − β + d) = 0, d > 3/2}. The curve γϕ in Figure 1 is identical to the
borderline in Figure 1 of Poyago-Theotoky (2007, p.71). The curve γϕ has the following property: lim γϕ =
d→+∞

(1 + β)2 (1 − β)/2β. Therefore, when β = 1, then γϕ disappears. Her investigation reveals that sign{ϕ} =
sign{zC − zN } = sign{SWC − SWN }.

8
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cartelization is invariably socially superior to environmental R&D competition, irrespective of
the value of γ. However, if d > 3/2, then ERJV cartelization is superior (inferior) to environmental R&D competition for all γ ≥ (<)γJV ≡ {γ(> 0)|J(d, γ; β) = 0, d > 3/2}.20 In the region
above (below) the curve γJV in Figure 1, SWCJ ≥ (<)SWN . These results are summarized as
Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. Presuming that β < 1, new findings are described below.
(i) If d < d ≤ 3/2, then SWCJ ≥ SWN for all γ > 0 and β ∈ [0, 1).
(ii) If d > 3/2 and γ ≥ γJV , then SWCJ ≥ SWN for all β ∈ [0, 1).
(iii) If d > 3/2 and γ < γJV , then SWCJ < SWN for all β ∈ [0, 1).
Poyago-Theotoky (2010) points out that negative emission taxes (emissions subsidies) might
be socially justified. When the value of d is in the interval (d, 3/2), and also the value of γ is
t ≡ 4d(3 − 2d)/(2d2 + d − 1), then the regulator can
strictly smaller than the critical value γCJ
mitigate market ineﬃciency through emissions subsidies and ERJV cartelization irrespective of
t in Figure 1,
the value of the spillover parameter.21 In fact, in Region I below the curve γCJ
we can observe that tCJ < 0 and SWCJ > SWC > SWN .22 Propositions 2 and 3 show that,
even in the case of ERJV cartelization, not only its desirability but also a negative emission
t (< γ t ),
tax (emissions subsidy) might still be socially justified. However, only when γ < γN
CJ
then tN < 0.23 Therefore, in Region IV below the curve γJV , the value of tN is always positive.
t
In Figure 1, Regions II and III respectively denote the region between γCJ
and γϕ , and the
region between γϕ and γJV . Whereas Poyago-Theotoky (2007) shows that γϕ represents the
borderline of sign{SWC − SWN }, the existence of γJV , which plays key roles in Proposition 3,
is newly revealed by this research. As Figure 1 clarifies, when β = 1, then Regions III and IV
disappear.24
Table 3 presents the welfare ranking and the sign of an emission tax rate in each region of
Figure 1. Figure 1 and Table 3 show that, in Regions I, II, and III, the implementation of ERJV
cartelization yields an improvement in social welfare. However, particularly addressing the
existence of Region IV, it seems clear that ERJV cartelization is not necessarily better than any
other scenario. Particularly with a small value of γ, (γ < γJV ), and a large value of d, (d > 3/2),
environmental R&D competition is socially eﬃcient. In other words, part (iii) of Proposition 3
shows that ERJV cartelization is socially harmful in Region IV. Therefore, it is apparent that
a social incentive for ERJV cartelization does not always exist. Additionally, it is important to
compare the cost-reducing R&D literature with our result to enrich the theoretical argument
in relation to competition policy in environmental innovation area. The welfare ranking in
Region IV is inconsistent with the findings of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988, 1990), Atallah
(2005a) and Lambertini and Rossini (2009) and others, who show the social superiority of RJV
20

It is straightforward to verify the existence and uniqueness of γJV . However, it is extremely diﬃcult to obtain
γJV explicitly by solving the cubic equation J(d, γ; β) = 0.
21
t
The critical value γCJ
≡ 4d(3 − 2d)/(2d2 + d − 1) is derived from tCJ = 0.
22
Our companion paper (Ouchida and Goto (2014)) reveals the emission-reducing eﬀects of negative emission
taxes (i.e., emission subsidies). That study is very closely related to the investigations conducted by this paper.
For details, see Proposition 2 and Figure 1(iv) in Ouchida and Goto (2014).
23
t
The critical value γN
≡ d(3 − 2d)(1 + β)2 /2(2d2 + d − 1) is derived from tN = 0.
24
See Appendix C and footnote 19 in this paper.
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(i) β = 0.00

(ii) β = 0.20

(iii) β = 0.40

(iv) β = 0.60

(v) β = 0.80

(vi) β = 1.00

Figure 1. Environmental R&D competition versus ERJV cartelization.
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cartelization.25 Moreover, the result of Proposition 3(iii) diﬀers greatly from the result of typical
textbook (Belleflamme and Peitz (2010, pp.498-499)), demonstrating that RJV cartelization
yields a socially superior performance to that obtained through non-cooperative R&D.
Table 3. Welfare ranking and the sign of the emission tax rate.
Region

Emission tax

Welfare ranking

I
II
III
IV

tCJ < 0
tCJ > 0
tCJ > 0
tN > 0

SWCJ > SWC > SWN
SWCJ > SWC > SWN
SWCJ > SWN > SWC
SWN > SWCJ > SWC

The reason for the existence of Region IV can be interpreted as follows. Greater R&D eﬀorts
decrease the emission tax rate determined during the second stage.26 In studies by Hepburn
(2006), Puller (2006), and Brunner et al.(2012), this decrease is designated as a “ratchet eﬀect.”
If the value of γ is small, then the joint-profit maximization eﬀect is dominated by the profitenhancing eﬀect through the ratchet eﬀect. For that reason, there can exist circumstances such
that zCJ < zN .27 Greater environmental R&D eﬀorts increase production levels and consumer
surplus. When the damage is severe and when R&D costs are highly eﬃcient, greater R&D eﬀorts
generated through R&D competition results in a large increase eﬀect on consumer surplus and
a large mitigating eﬀect on environmental damage. These eﬀects dominate the increasing eﬀect
of R&D costs. Therefore, the equilibrium social welfare under environmental R&D competition
is greater than in the case of ERJV cartelization. However, when the damage coeﬃcient is small
(d < 3/2), the equilibrium social welfare under environmental R&D competition is dominated by
that under ERJV cartelization because of the small mitigating eﬀect of environmental damage.

4.3

Theoretical contributions

In this article, two theoretical findings are newly provided by the modelling of a firm’s endogenous
choice of ERJV. Each firm can endogenously set the value of technological spillover as β = 1, only
if both firms agree to form an ERJV at stage 2. That game-theoretic setting of ERJV enables
us to evaluate the welfare performance of four scenarios (in Table 1): environmental R&D
competition, environmental R&D cartelization, ERJV competition, and ERJV cartelization.
25

Atallah (2005a) examines the case of asymmetric spillover. His analysis includes results of the case of symmetric perfect spillover. Therefore, it is easy to ascertain the social superiority of RJV cartelization under
symmetrically perfect spillover. For details, see Figure 7 of Atallah (2005a, p.933). In addition, for details of
the well-known R&D models by d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988, 1990) and Kamien et al. (1992), see reports
by Amir (2000b) and Amir et al. (2003). Furthermore, in the literature related to cost-reducing innovation,
some works reveal that industry-wide RJV cartelization is not necessarily socially eﬃcient. As examples, see Yin
(1999), Amir (2000a), and Yun et al. (2000). The models constructed in those studies diﬀer from the model
presented here.
26
See, Equation (1). In fact, one obtains that ∂t(zi , zj )/∂zi < 0.
27
A comparison between zCJ and zN yields the following result: zCJ ≥ (<)zN for all γ ≥ (<)γ̂N ≡ d(1 − β)δ/μ,
where μ ≡ (1 + d)2 [2d2 + (4 − β)d − 1](> 0) and δ ≡ 18d3 + 41d2 + 12d − 15 + β(d + 3)(d2 + 3d − 1)(> 0). Therefore,
if the value of γ is small (γ < γ̂N ), then zCJ < zN . This result diﬀers from the result reported by d’Aspremont
and Jacquemin (1988, 1990), which showed that cost-reducing R&D eﬀorts under RJV cartelization are invariably
greater than under any other scenario. In addition, this result implies that the case of ERJV cartelization does
not always yield larger investments than under any other scenario presented in Table 1.

11

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper898

12

Ouchida and Daisaku Goto: Environmental Research Joint Ventures and Time-Consistent Em

The first finding is that each firm invariably has a private incentive for ERJV cartelization
(Proposition 1). However, the second finding is that ERJV cartelization does not necessarily
lead to social eﬃciency (Propositions 2 and 3). More precisely, in Regions I, II, and III in Figure
1, ERJV cartelization is socially beneficial and feasible. However, in Region IV, firms can not
receive both profits under ERJV competition/cartelization (πNJ and πCJ ) because the welfaremaximizing regulator can accommodate neither information sharing nor R&D coordination,
whereas firms prefer ERJV cartelization.
These findings justify that the stages of ERJV policy and firm’s decision on ERJV are
invariably required. In other words, the indispensability of examinations of stages 1 and 2 in the
present model is proved by the results of Propositions 2 and 3, although the Poyago-Theotoky
model is missing both stages even though there invariably exist firms’ private incentives for ERJV
cartelization. Instead, this article presents development of the five-stage game by adding stages
of ERJV policy (stage 1) and firm’s decisions on ERJV (stage 2) to the Poyago-Theotoky’s
three-stage model, and also provides complete examinations. Therefore, this paper provides
theoretical foundations of ERJV policy and firms’ behavior under a time-consistent emission
tax.

4.4

Policy implications

Policy implications derived from results of our theoretical analysis must be considered. This
paper presents the possibility of the superiority of ERJV cartelization. In Regions I, II, and III
shown in Figure 1, no intervention for ERJV cartelization is necessary. However, in stark contrast
to the well-known result of cost-reducing R&D, we infer that environmental R&D competition
is socially eﬃcient when pollution abatement is highly cost-eﬃcient (γ < γJV ), and also when
environmental damage is severe (d > 3/2).28 In Region IV in Figure 1, the government should
allow neither information sharing nor R&D coordination.
The category of pollution abatement technology in this model is called “end-of-pipe.” Measures of this category achieve reduction of the amount of emissions by absorption at the end
of production processes. Flue gas desulfurization equipment and activated carbon adsorption
equipment are examples of this type. As an example of the oligopolistic market corresponding to
this model, we can mention oil refinery firms and firms with huge chemical plants.29 In fact, such
oligopolistic firms use end-of-pipe technology and also invest in R&D for quality improvement
of catalysts. The results presented in the present paper provide important policy implications
related to whether ERJV cartelization in a horizontal relation is allowed socially.
28
As described in this paper, the value of d is assumed as an exogenous damage parameter. Strictly speaking,
however, the value of d should be derived from the scientific findings of environmental epidemiology and public
health. Therefore, more interdisciplinary studies must be conducted to produce eﬀective ERJV guidelines.
29
In Japan, 20 major firms involved in petroleum and chemical industries established the “Research Association of Refinery Integration for Group-Operation (RING)” in May 2000. For details, see RING’s website (URL:
http://www.ring.or.jp/). The main purpose of RING is to encourage RJV projects for cost-eﬀective plant operation and emissions reduction among participants to enhance a competitive advantage and to survive in the
international market. Particularly with respect to RING’s ERJV projects, the striking characteristic is that the
research consortia consist of firms belonging to diﬀerent industries. Apparently, the participating firms have
intentionally avoided a horizontal ERJV to avoid exposure to prosecution for violation of antitrust laws. Is a
horizontal ERJV socially harmful, or beneficial? At least the Japanese antitrust authorities have not earnestly
considered the question. Other such countries might exist. The results presented in this paper are important and
indispensable for the design of a practical competition policy for ERJV.
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5

Concluding remarks

This article presents an analytical framework of ERJV in Cournot duopoly. As described in
Section 2, we explicitly introduce ERJV formations with the following condition. Each firm can
endogenously choose the perfect information-sharing of technological knowledge, only if both
firms agree to form an ERJV. Under the setup, this paper evaluates the welfare performance of
ERJV.
Our analysis obtains the following facts and policy implications. If environmental damage
is large, and if the parameter of environmental R&D cost is small enough, then environmental
R&D competition is socially eﬃcient. It is particularly interesting that our analysis reveals the
social superiority of environmental R&D competition, although that scenario is the case of “NO
information sharing and NO R&D coordination.” Under such circumstances, the antitrust authorities should disallow not only ERJV cartelization but also environmental R&D cartelization.
This result is fairly counterintuitive and diﬀers from the well-known conclusions reported in the
existing literature. However, if environmental damage is small, alternatively if there is severe
environmental damage and high ineﬃciency of environmental R&D costs, then ERJV cartelization is socially eﬃcient. Under those circumstances, firms should be allowed to form an ERJV
cartelization. Such cooperative behavior yields improved social welfare. Furthermore, each firm
invariably has a private incentive for ERJV cartelization. Our results can considerably enrich
future RJV studies in environmental innovation areas, although only a few ERJV studies have
been made heretofore.
In the last two decades, although the importance of environmental R&D has been increasingly socially recognized, a few studies have examined the welfare performance of ERJV.30
To design appropriate environmental R&D policy, detailed and practical policy suggestions on
ERJV are desired by policymakers of many countries.31 As an example, the Japanese antitrust
guidelines for RJV (Japan Fair Trade Commission [JFTC] (1993) and its amended versions) are
ambiguous and frail.32 Unfortunately, the Japanese antitrust authorities (JFTC) have formed
detailed policy guidelines for ERJV only to a slight degree. This fact signifies that the Japanese
antitrust authorities’ discretionary power on ERJV is too strong. Under such regulatory circumstances, the ERJV participants might be faced with the risk of becoming a noncompliant
(or administratively sanctioned) firm involuntarily because the rules are not enacted definitely.
In addition, the lack of detailed rules might generate a disincentive to forming an ERJV. This
30

For example, see Katsoulacos et al. (2001) and McDonald and Poyago-Theotoky (2012). Chiou and Hu
(2001) examined environmental R&D formations under precommitment of an emission tax. McDonald and
Poyago-Theotoky (2012) and Poyago-Theotoky (2007, footnote 2) presented important explanations about the
misleading analysis conducted by Chiou and Hu (2001).
31
The EU’s antitrust guidelines for the horizontal cooperation agreements are “Guidelines on
the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements.”
These appear on the European Commission’s website (URL:
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/legislation/horizontal.html).
Regarding the US guidelines
for JV, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) issued “Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors” on the FTC’s website (URL:
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf). Caloghirou et al. (2003), Caloghirou et al. (2004)
and Motta (2004, Chapters 1 and 4) reported historical, legal, and economic explanations for RJV. Grossman
and Shapiro (1986) provided important arguments related to RJV and antitrust guidelines. These studies are
useful for understanding the antitrust policies of influential countries and regions.
32
For details, see the website of JFTC (URL: http://www.jftc.go.jp/en/).
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research provides theoretical findings to improve such weak points.
Some directions for future research are described below. First, the case of an asymmetric
spillover parameter must be analyzed in line with Atallah’s (2005a, 2005b, 2007) examinations.
Second, it is necessary to explore the case of price competition in a diﬀerentiated duopoly. Third,
it is important to examine environmental R&D cooperation in a vertical relation.

Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1: Diﬀerentiation between πCJ and πC is given as
πCJ − πC =

2γ(1 − β)BA2
≥ 0,
∆2 [∆β=1 ]2

(3)

where B ≡ [2d2 + 3d − 1]2 [8d(3 + 2d) + γ(1 + d)2 ][2d(2d + 3)(1 + β)2 + γ(1 + d)2 ] > 0, ∆ ≡
2γ(1 + d)2 + 4d(3 + 2d)(1 + β)2 > 0, and ∆β=1 ≡ 2γ(1 + d)2 + 16d(3 + 2d) > 0. Only when
β = 1, then πCJ = πC .
Poyago-Theotoky (2007) proves that πC > πN . In fact, from Equation (16) in PoyagoTheotoky (2007, p.70),
πC − πN =

A2 (1 + d)2 κ2
> 0,
4∆2 Γ2

(4)

where κ ≡ d(3 − 2d)(1 − β)(1 + β)2 + 2γ[d + β(2d2 + 2d − 1)] and Γ ≡ 2γ(1 + d)2 + d(1 + β)[3(3 +
β) + d(7 + β)] > 0.
Equations (3) and (4) show that each firm invariably has some private incentives for ERJV
cartelization. Therefore, we have that πCJ ≥ πC > πN for all d > d, γ > 0 and β ∈ [0, 1]. ¤

Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 2: After some manipulation, the diﬀerence between SWCJ and SWC is
derived as
SWCJ − SWC =

4(1 − β)(3 + β)LA2
≥ 0,
[∆β=1 ]2 ∆2

where
L ≡ 32d3 (3 + 2d)2 (5 + 2d)(1 + β)2 + 8d2 (3 + 2d)[4(1 + d)(3 + 2d)
+(1 + β)2 (48d5 + 216d4 + 292d3 + 76d2 − 51d + 5)]γ
+2d(1 + d)2 [64d5 + 446d3 + 155d2 − 64d + 3
+(1 + β)2 (2d2 + 3d − 1)(8d3 + 26d2 + 21d + 1)]γ 2
+(1 + d)4 (2d2 + 3d − 1)(2d2 + 5d + 1)γ 3 > 0.
∆(> 0) and ∆β=1 (> 0) are both defined in Appendix A. Therefore, we have SWCJ ≥ SWC for
all d > d, γ > 0 and β ∈ [0, 1]. ¤
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Appendix C
Welfare comparison: We obtain the following result.
SWCJ − SWN =

J(d, γ; β)A2
R0
[∆β=1 ]2 Γ2

Therein,
J(d, γ; β) ≡ y + 8γ[k0 + k1 γ + k2 γ 2 ],
y ≡ −64d3 (1 − β)(1 + β)2 (1 + d)2 (2d − 3)[21 + 51d + 26d2
+β(3 + 13d + 6d2 )] R 0,
λ3 ≡ 32d5 + 201d4 + 324d3 + 154d2 − 12d + 9 > 0,
λ2 ≡ 768d5 + 2457d4 + 2924d3 + 994d2 − 180d + 81 > 0,
λ1 ≡ 2720d5 + 7735d4 + 8172d3 + 2278d2 − 452d + 279 > 0,
λ0 ≡ 1216d5 + 2023d4 + 132d3 − 1666d2 − 156d + 687 > 0,
k0 ≡ d2 {(1 − β)[4(1 + β)[16(3 + β) + (1 + β)(1 − β)]d6 + λ3 β 3 + λ2 β 2
+λ1 β + λ0 ] + 128(1 + d)2 (2d + 1)(2d + 3)(2d2 + 3d − 1)} > 0,
k1 ≡ 2d(1 + d)2 {(1 − β)[d2 (d + 1)(d + 2)β 3 + d(1 + d)(2d3 + 14d2
+16d − 1)β 2 + d(8d4 + 101d3 + 200d2 + 91d − 19)β + 94d5
+406d4 + 499d3 + 72d2 − 112d + 5β + 27]
+4[20d5 + 144d4 + 170d3 + 50d2 − 2d − 9]} > 0,
k2 ≡ (1 + d)4 {(1 − β)[8d2 + 4(5 + β)d + 7 + 3β]d2
+4d4 + 4d3 + d2 + 2(4 + β)d − 3} > 0.
In addition, ∆β=1 (> 0) and Γ(> 0) are both defined in Appendix A. It is straightforward to
verify the sign of each of the definitions presented above.
If d < d ≤ 3/2, then y ≥ 0 for all β ∈ [0, 1). Therefore, when d < d ≤ 3/2, then J(d, γ; β) ≥ 0;
i.e., SWCJ ≥ SWN irrespective of the value of γ. However, when d > 3/2, then y < 0 for all
β ∈ [0, 1). Therefore, when d > 3/2, then the sign of J(d, γ; β) is indeterminate. As portrayed
in Figure 1, SWCJ ≥ (<)SWN for all γ ≥ (<)γJV ≡ {γ(> 0)|J(d, γ; β) = 0, d > 3/2}. From the
definition of J(d, γ; β), verifying the existence and uniqueness of γJV is straightforward.
Furthermore, assuming that d > 3/2, only when β = 1, we have y = 0; i.e., SWCJ > SWNJ .
This observation readily implies that there invariably exists some Region IV unless β = 1.
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